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ABSTRACT
This study examines the efficacy of the recent amendment in Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2012 in curbing the likelihood of earnings 
management in share repurchases policy in Malaysia. Based on 275 firm-year observations among share repurchasing firms between 2006 and 2010, 
we find that by frequently repurchases shares, companies are able to manage their earnings upwards. It is also found that ethnic diversity can help curb 
the potential misuse of managerial discretion in deciding whether to frequently repurchase shares. Our study contributes to the existing literature on 
board characteristics in several ways. First, it provides evidence that board diversity in terms of ethnicity can significantly affect companies’ policy. 
We find that companies with less diverse board as measured by ethnic group are more likely to frequently embark on share repurchase to seemingly 
improve current earnings. Second, we find that large board size can significantly reduce the tendency of managerial opportunistic behavior. The study 
provides early evidence of the effectiveness of recent Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2012 which recommended diverse balance of board 
members to ensure proper monitoring role and curbing the likelihood of unwarranted managerial opportunistic behavior by unduly controlling owners.
Keywords: Board Diversity, Corporate Governance, Business Strategy 
JEL Classifications: M480, M140, M190
1. INTRODUCTION
Share repurchases were meant to help companies to stabilize 
their share prices during a depressed global market. Malaysian 
companies were first allowed to repurchase their own shares after 
The Asian Financial Crisis 1997-1998. Companies are allowed to 
repurchase or buy back their own shares by properly following 
strict procedures as prescribed by the Companies Act, accounting 
guide through Technical Release and Bursa Listing Requirements 
(Laws of Malaysia, 1965; Bursa Malaysia, 2009; MASB, 1999). 
There were few companies interested in buying back their shares 
in the inception years, but the trend is growing. Abdul Latif (2010) 
finds the number of companies announcing share repurchases have 
amplified from only 16 companies in 1999 to 106 companies in 
2005, an increase of almost 12-fold. Share repurchases, better 
known as share buyback in Malaysia, have always been regarded 
to signal an undervaluation (Hung and Chen, 2010). Companies 
believed that their prices are undervalued and believed that better 
price performance is on the way. On the contrary Abdul Latif 
et al. (2013) and McNally and Smith (2007) find that there is no 
significant difference in long-run price performance between share 
repurchases group and the control group regardless of different 
measurements used.
It is important to note that not all share repurchases are the 
same. Regulations and market structures could impose different 
implications to the types and practices of share repurchases 
worldwide. For example, companies in the United States and 
Australia have more options on the types of share repurchases 
method available (Bartov, 1991). Companies, depending on their 
needs, have the option to use either fixed tender offer, Dutch 
auction tender offer or open market share repurchases. In contrast, 
only open market share repurchases are allowed for Malaysian 
companies.
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Studies on emerging market are still limited thus warrant further 
investigations. We examine whether the recent improvement 
in Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2012 regarding 
board diversity can help curb the potential misuse of managerial 
discretion in deciding whether to frequently repurchase their 
shares. Our study contributes to the existing literature on board 
characteristics in several ways. First, it provides evidence that 
companies can manage their earnings by frequently repurchase 
their own shares. Secondly, we find that board diversity can 
significantly affect companies’ payout policy. We find that 
companies with less diverse board as measured by ethnic group 
are more likely to frequently embark on share repurchase which 
seemingly improved current earnings. Thirdly, we find that a larger 
board size can significantly reduce the tendency of managerial 
opportunistic behavior.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Previous studies on the price effect of share repurchases evidenced 
that there were significant positive effects on companies’ price 
performance. Bartov (1991) finds companies earned positive 
abnormal earnings surrounding share repurchases announcements 
whilst reference Ikenberry et al. (2000) report favorable market 
reactions on long-run performance. On the contrary, Abdul 
Latif et al. (2013) do not find any significant difference in price 
performance following actual share repurchases in Malaysia. 
The study reports that in the long-run (1-3 years period) price 
performances are equivalently similar regardless of the method 
employed (CAR and buy-and-hold returns model) or the 
benchmark used for control companies. Likewise, McNally and 
Smith (2007) find that there are no abnormal returns following 
actual share repurchases using previously documented data.
It is argued that companies are repurchasing shares to fulfill 
managerial motives (Abdul Latif, 2010; Kahle, 2002; Rodriguez, 
2008; Hribar et al., 2006). Based on managerial opportunism 
hypothesis, Hribar et al. (2006) finds evidence to support that 
managers can carefully plan and time repurchase activities so 
as to meet earnings expectations. Using 29,339 repurchase 
announcements during 1980-1998, the study finds substantial 
evidence that companies strategically manage earnings downward 
prior to actual share repurchases. By doing so, companies are 
able to buy back shares at a lower price. Later, if share prices 
unpredictably rise, the repurchase companies will earn abnormal 
gains. Likewise, Di and Marciukaityte (2015) report positive 
association between earnings management through discretionary 
accruals before share repurchases. The study argues that companies 
manage earnings as an attempt to smooth expected earnings. 
Managerial opportunism hypothesis argued that managers with 
significant ownership in the companies’ equity would be the 
ultimate beneficiaries. Nonetheless, earnings management in 
whatever method is considered damaging if it would deliberately 
cause any party to suffer losses.
Farrell et al. (2014) propose that good corporate governance 
mechanisms are important to limit the likelihood of earnings 
management through share repurchase activities. The study 
reports strong relationships between the likelihood of earnings 
management and less independent board as well as the presence of 
CEO duality, where CEO holds both positions as the chairman of 
the board and as the managing director. CEO duality could prove 
to be damaging to companies’ future performance (Taufil Mohd 
et al., 2016). Board diversity is one of the recommended agenda in 
the recent Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2012. Board 
members can be of different diversity type, including ethnicity, 
gender, or experience. Diversity on boardroom has gained much 
attention from researchers, analysts, corporations, regulators 
and shareholders. A survey by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2014) 
indicates that the demand for board diversity, whether in the form 
of gender or ethnic diversity is increasing. Some countries such 
as in the US and UK may have even requested that the company 
provides quotas for diversity implementation (Upadhyay and 
Zeng, 2014).
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The impact of board characteristics on share repurchase frequencies 
is investigated in this study. Following Farrugia et al. (2011) share 
repurchase frequency is defined as the number of times a company 
initiates share repurchases from 2006 to 2010. The company is 
considered as a frequent repurchaser if it initiated at least three 
repurchases in the 5-year span. Sample companies were collected 
from all actual share repurchases undertaken by non-financial 
public listed companies. To ensure visibility of the results, only 
share repurchases exceeding 0.1% of ordinary shares outstanding 
were included. A total of 770 completed shares repurchases were 
observed in this period. Out of these, 405 observations involved 
share repurchases of <0.1%; thus, leaving 275 observations 
suitable for analysis. The following equation was estimated to 
examine the relationship between board characteristics and the 
frequency of share repurchases:
FREQUENCYit = β0 + β1 REPURCHASEit + β2 BOARDit + β5 CDIRit 
+ β6 FDIRit + β7 CEPSit + β8 LNMVit + εit (1)
FREQUENCY is a binary code which equal to 1 if the frequency 
of share repurchases is 3 or more in a 5-year period, otherwise 
it is 0. REPURCHASE is the total number of repurchase shares 
scaled by the number of outstanding ordinary shares. BOARD 
is the total number of directors. CDIR is the number of Chinese 
directors serving on the board.
CEPS is change in earnings per share (EPS), a measure of earnings 
management through EPS performance. It is calculated as the 
change of EPS minus “as if EPS.” “As if EPS” is calculated 
assuming share repurchases had not occurred. LNMV is the natural 
log of company’s market value, a measure of company size. ε is 
the error term.
4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
4.1. Descriptive Analysis
Descriptive statistics of sample companies are summarized in 
Table 1. On average, sample companies repurchased their own 
shares more than 3 times in the 5-year span. This means that 
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companies in Malaysia are frequent buyers. In contrast, companies 
in United States repurchase their shares infrequently, only once 
in 3 years (Jagannathan and Stephens, 2003). The percentage of 
shares repurchased is quite small with an average (median) of 
1.7% (1%). This figure is lower than those in the United States and 
Sweden where the reported average percentage in open-market 
share repurchase program is about 8% and 3.5% respectively 
(Ridder, 2015) On average eight directors served on the board. 
Out of this, about six are of Chinese ethnicity (CDIR) and only 
two are Malays (MALAYDIR). Despite the growing appeal for 
diversity, the proportion of ethnic groups serving on public listed 
companies remained fairly unchanged. Between 65% and 69% of 
board members are of Chinese ethnicity while only 25% is Malays. 
On average the CEPS is negative 0.021 cents, which means that if 
companies had not repurchased their own shares, the EPS would 
be worse than the currently reported in EPS. Based on the above 
results, it could be hypothesized that companies buy back their 
own shares to smooth their reported EPS.
4.2. Regression Analysis
Before assessing the association between board of directors’ 
attributes and frequency of share repurchases, correlation analysis 
between the independent variables is carried out. The correlation 
between Chinese directors (CDIR) and total directors (TOTDIR) 
is 0.75. However, none of the pairwise correlation is significantly 
higher than 0.8 suggesting that the impact of multicollinearity is 
not severe. Since this study employed a reasonably large sample, 
the normality assumption does not assume a critical role. The 
results suggested that frequent repurchases bought smaller volume 
of shares and experienced lower earnings performance measured 
by CEPS. The greater are the CEPS, the more frequent are the 
repurchases. The result suggests that managers might use share 
repurchases to smooth earnings. Furthermore, the results show that 
larger board size lead to less frequent repurchases while Chinese 
directors lead to more frequent repurchases. The coefficient for 
executive directors is negative as expected but not significant. 
Size of companies as measured by LNMV is not associated with 
frequency of share repurchases decision (Table 2).
5. CONCLUSION
The study examines whether the recent improvement in Malaysian 
corporate governance code regarding board diversity can help 
curb the potential misuse of managerial discretion in deciding 
whether to frequently repurchase their shares. The findings 
confirmed that companies frequently repurchase shares to manage 
reported EPS. It is evidenced that board diversity as measured by 
director’s ethnicity is significantly associated with frequency of 
share repurchases. The less diverse is the board, the more likely 
a company will frequently embark on share repurchases. Next, 
the study finds that larger board size can significantly reduce the 
tendency of managerial opportunistic behavior. Therefore, the 
study provides early evidence of the efficacy of recent Malaysian 
Code on Corporate Governance 2012, which recommended 
diversity among board members to ensure proper monitoring 
role and curbing the likelihood of unwarranted managerial 
opportunistic behavior. Future study may examine whether 
control and power of independent and ethnic directors entail better 
monitoring and fiduciary duty.
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